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ABSTRACT
Background Prescribing errors are common and
costly. Technology should enable safer prescribing.
The two main current methods of doing so are
computer initiated clinical support software (CDSS)
and the user initiated information retrieval (IR)
systems. However, despite the near universal avail-
ability of computerised prescribing support in the
UK, errors continue.
Objective To evaluate the experience of UK pri-
mary health care professionals using CDSS and to
consolidate current technical opinion and literature
in this area with the aim of creating useful hypoth-
eses for guiding future academic investigation and
industrial development.
Study design The study was a synthesis, drawing
together a literature review and views from experts
in the ﬁeld to explore from a qualitative perspective
where and how CDSS and IR could be used to
improve prescribing safety in primary care. We
conducted a literature review, held a workshop to
explore issues in practice and had a follow-up expert
panel meeting to conﬁrm the ﬁndings. The workshop
was recorded, transcribed verbatim and analysed
thematically.
Participants and setting The study involved pri-
mary care practitioners, system developers, infor-
mation suppliers and academics.
Outcomes Although CDSS is incorporated into
primary care electronic patient record systems there
does not appear to be an associated marked reduc-
tion in prescribing errors. Clinicians are frustrated
with current systems, and are concerned these may
have a negative impact on patients. There is an un-
helpful signal–noise ratio with too many clinically
irrelevant alerts and insuﬃcient recognition of the
potentialdownsidesof over alerting–possiblymaking
compliance less likely, having a negative impact on
the doctor–patient relationship and overloading clin-
icians. A preferred way forward would be alerts
based on quantitative risk assessment of interaction
at the level of the preparations being prescribed,
rather than theoretical possibilities of interactions
between classes of drugs.
Conclusion Prescribing errors remain a major source
of unnecessary morbidity and mortality and cur-
rent systems do not appear to have signiﬁcantly
reduced this problem; nor has the extensive literature
about how to reduce unnecessary alerts been taken
into account. We need a new and more rational
basis for the selection and presentation of alerts that
would help, not hinder, the clinician’s performance.
Keywords: information technology, prescribing
alerts, prescribing errors
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Introduction
Medical errors occurring at the hands of clinicians
unfortunately come about regularly and are costly in
both ﬁnancial terms and in terms of patients’ health.1
At a fundamental level, practising medicine with
incomplete information regarding the patient or rel-
evant to the management of the patient is thought to
be amajor contributory factor in the aetiology of these
errors.1 A retrospective analysis2 of clinical records in
the UK revealed that 10.8% of patients had experi-
enced an adverse event on medication. Half of these
were thought to be preventable by ordinary standards
of care. One third of the events resulted inmoderate to
severe disability or death. In a separate study, 72.6%of
iatrogenic adverse drug reactionswere found to be due
to a fundamental lack of knowledge regarding the
drug therapy, the nomenclature, or patient factors
aﬀecting the use of the therapy.3 The aim of prescrib-
ing support software or e-prescribing software includ-
ing CDSS and IR is to facilitate the provision of this
information at the point of care for the patient4 (see
Box 1 for deﬁnitions of these key terms). There is
international evidence that some applications of e-
prescribing software have successfully improved patient
safety through thismechanism.5–9However, despite this
optimism the range of areas where beneﬁt has been
realised are limited and prescribing safety problems
remain a substantial issue.10
Primary care in the UK, along with many other
countries that run personal registration systems, is
almost universally computerised.11 One of the few
areas where computer use saves time is in prescrib-
ing.12,13 Primary care electronic patient record (EPR)
systems enable electronic prescribing to be linked to
CDSS and IR. The most widespread prescribing sup-
port software in UK primary care practices is the
prescribing alert system, warning of potential drug
interactions and of a previous record of allergy.14 These
systems are included as a standard part of primary care
EPR systems. Although rolled out relatively slowly, the
most common use of CDSS is to support anticoagu-
lation prescribing in primary care, usually in nurse run
clinics.15
We carried out this study to evaluate the experience
of UK primary healthcare professionals using CDSS
and to consolidate current technical opinion and
literature in this area, with the aim of creating useful
hypotheses to guide future academic investigation and
industrial development.
Method
We carried out a literature review to gain an under-
standing of the key terms, concepts and recent devel-
opments in using computers to improve prescribing
safety. This included a Medline database search of the
terms ‘e-prescribing’, ‘clinical decision support sys-
tem’ and ‘information retrieval’. The internet search
engine ‘Google’18 was also used to ﬁnd links to NHS
websites on e-prescribing software. We included only
ﬁndings which might be applicable in primary care.
A workshop was organised by SdeL, RTJ, IS and EC
and held on behalf of the Primary Health Care Spe-
cialist Group of the British Computer Society as part
of the HC2008 healthcare computing conference. Over
30 delegates attended the workshop. The primary aim
was to describe current best practice, and to explore
the role of and best practice in the use of prescribing
support software. The attendants included a range of
informaticians, academic clinicians, pharmacists, clin-
icians with an IT (information technology) interest,
human factor/user experience consultants and medi-
cal and non-medical commercial IT vendors, as well as
members of theNational Health Service (NHS) national
programme for IT development team.
The workshop was a series of four talks given by
academics and industry leaders in the subject, fol-
lowed by a discussion. The talks given outlined the
scale of the safety problem with prescribing and the
Box 1 Key deﬁnitions
Prescribing support software/e-prescribing: The utilisation of electronic systems to facilitate and enhance
the communication of a prescription, aiding the choice, administration or supply of a medicine through
decision support and providing a robust audit trail for the entire medicines use process.16 This includes IR
and CDSS.
Clinical decision support software (CDSS): ‘active knowledge systems which use two or more items of
patient data to generate case-speciﬁc advice.’16
Information retrieval (IR): ‘Information retrieval is concerned with enabling people to locate useful
information in large, relatively unstructured, computer-accessible archives. In this respect, anyone who has
ever used aweb search enginewill have had some practical experience of IR, as theweb represents perhaps the
largest and most diverse of all computer-accessible archives.’17
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rationale for the development of IT solutions. Some
of the methods for developing software to improve
prescribing safety were mentioned, as well as the
characteristics that such software should include to
make it optimally functional. An anticoagulation clinical
decision support programme was used as a worked
example. The discussion that followed was semi-
structured. The delegates were asked the question ‘Are
we addressing the right issues to improve prescribing
safety?’, and consequent ideas and themes were devel-
oped during the discussion. SdeL acted as chair to
ensure that all delegate views were represented.
The workshop was tape recorded, and transcribed
verbatim. Delegates used a hand-held microphone
and the panel desk microphones. The transcript was
produced by an experienced transcriber and was
subsequently checked and annotated. The tapes were
listened to for any additional context which might
further explain meaning. The transcript data was
subsequently analysed and interpreted with the assist-
ance of the computer program NVivo 2.0. The
transcribed data was disintegrated into segments and
reintegrated into themes in the analysis.
The analysis results and conclusions were sub-
sequently fed back to SdeL, EC, IS, RTJ (who are
expert panellists in the CDSS and prescribing alert
ﬁelds) and discussed. The major themes were devel-
oped and a consensus-building processwas conducted
through communications over the following several
months, until conclusions were reached.
Results
Our ﬁndings from the literature were that preventable
prescribing errors are common and that these often
result in patient harm. However, although there may
be improved reporting with electronic prescribing there
still appears to be an ongoing high rate of avoidable
patient harm due to prescribing errors.
End-users (principally general practitioners (GPs))
at the workshop reported that prescribing alerts were
more often a source of frustration more than of help.
This topic took up most of the discussion. Delegates
also reported concerns about the current prescribing
support prompts, primarily the low speciﬁcity of the
pop-ups, which were too numerous, often unhelpful
and therefore ignored. Low speciﬁcity prompts may
frustrate a clinician:
‘.....if in my practice system I have an elderly person who
might be on a diuretic, I give them a tiny bit of one half
percent steroid cream, my system throws up this warning
that says ‘‘Steroids may result in ﬂuid retention’’, and it’s
terribly undermining of conﬁdence with the patient.’
(Academic GP)
There was agreement that excessive numbers of low
speciﬁcity pop-ups result in low utility:
‘Alerts that pop up all the time that annoy people, which
has been alluded to several times. I mean, if an alert comes
up once in a while people notice it, if they come up all the
time they don’t.’ (Software developer)
Clinicians want high speciﬁcity information that will
help themprovide the best care in the practical clinical
scenario:
‘I only want to know what’s relevant at that point of the
process.’ (GP)
Clinicians felt that the dual prescribing alert system
was unwelcome. The disruption caused by needing to
read excessive and non-contextual prompts impinged
on the work ﬂow within the consultation. The current
practice of having the vendor’s prescribing alert systems
as well as additional alerts mandated by the National
Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) may add to the infor-
mation overload. This may not be a practical model
for continued development.
‘It’s alright when there’s one or two or three, on
methotrexate we’ve had some bad events so we’ve got to
do this, then we’ve had some bad events with this so we’ve
got to do that, and that, and that, and that, and that, and
that ... And I’m afraid – and I don’t know if there’s anybody
here from NPSA ... that really the approach is not a
hammer to crack a nut I suppose. That’ll work for the
ﬁrst one, two, three or four, but it won’t work for 200.’
(GP)
Alerts may suggest that the clinician has made an error
and may provoke patient anxiety, compromising ad-
herence to treatment.
Some clinicians felt that their authority with the
patient was undermined by the visual (e.g. the red
exclamatory error – see Figure 1) and auditory disrup-
tion caused by prescribing alerts. GPs felt that patients
might perceive that an alert from the computer system
informing the doctor of an error was being ignored. It
was thought that this might create unfounded worries
for patients and might impact on the adherence of the
patient to the medication.
GPs also felt undermined with patients by these
systems:
‘....anti-rheumatoid drugs ... And you’ve got a patient that
you’re encouraging to take, you know, horrible medicine,
‘‘You really, really want to take them,’’ and then you’ve
got this, ‘‘donk’’, for methotrexate or, you know, that
comes up that you’ve actually physically got to cancel. My
computer goes ‘‘donk’’ when it does it’ (GP)
Prescribing alerts may also cause worry for patients:
‘...it is unhelpful and creates a false worry. Becausemy day
to day practice is I see an awful lot of false worries and
cancel a lot of them very quickly because of the impact on
patients.’ (GP)
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‘.....because I do sit there and the patient’s sort of doubts ...
‘‘You mean it’s terribly dangerous, doctor?’’’ (GP)
Information overload may have a negative impact on
cognitive performance. Some workshop participants
were concerned that the information overload from
low speciﬁcity alerts combined with a cumbersome user
interface could lead to the clinician being distracted
and pressurised. This could compromise his or her
cognitive performance and therefore jeopardise the
quality of care provided and potentially increase the
risk to the patient.
‘I think if they’ve got to jump through so many hoops
putting their prescription into the system, they’re not
focusing on the task or they’re not focusing on the patient
and the medicine they’re trying to prescribe for the patient’s
condition, they’re focusing on the screen. And they’re
trying to think, well do I have to type that in, do I have to
pick that drop-down, do I have to move my mouse over
there?’ (Software developer)
Proposed methods of resolving
problems with CDSS
A proposed solution to the problem of low speciﬁcity
alerts was tomake a change in the process that generates
the alerts. The use of substantive quantitativemethods
using hazard and likelihood criteria from adverse drug
events would allow an evidence-based calculation of
the risk associated with each drug to bemade. Current
sources of quantitative data on adverse drug reactions
include theMedicines andHealthcare Products Regu-
latory Agency’s Yellow Card scheme19 and the results
of data analysis from drug trials. The potential beneﬁt of
a prescribing alert to this risk could then be balanced
against thepotential ‘costs’ of eachalert.Thecosts include
the detrimental eﬀects of information overload on clin-
ical performance, patient anxiety and medication com-
pliance, for which evidence should also be collected.
The NHS should require risk-based assessment of
prescribing alerts, so they ﬂag real rather than
hypothesised risk:
‘One of the things the NHS should move towards is risk-
based assessment, because obviously you could have
something that was highly speciﬁc and highly sensitive
but actually it going wrong was of no consequence or of
such minimal consequence that it wasn’t important’
(Academic GP)
There was support for the use of quantitative methods
to be implemented to perform risk assessments:
‘...industrial strength risk management with lots of quan-
titative methods’ (Informatician)
Figure 1 Example of prescribing pop-up alert
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However, some were more cautious, as there was not
as yet any evidence base for this approach. Prescribing
software needs to be validated like any other part of
clinical care:
‘...like any other part of clinical care that you’re doing ... it
needs to be validated’ (Clinician)
There was an interest in developing the more ad-
vanced forms of decision support by increasing the
complexity of clinical coding behind the software.
Advanced decision support is capable of picking up
a broader range of safety hazards and could further
improve prescribing safety. The linking of the pre-
scribing support software to the patient’s demographic
details and diagnostic codes might be needed to sub-
stantially improve speciﬁcity and sensitivity. Diagnostic
coding quality has been much improved as a conse-
quence of the change to a ﬁnancially incentivised quality
based contract and the widespread use of computer
links with laboratories. Advanced CDSS applied in
this way could also improve speciﬁcity or context
relevancy of alerts as only advice relevant to the patient
would be included. The software would, however,
have to be quite intelligent in order to discern which
of the many coded clinical factors are relevant at that
speciﬁc point of the care plan.
‘An extension of prescribing support to include linkage to
key Read codes or SNOMED codes within GP systems to
make it more intelligent, because that coding is there and
linkage to certain speciﬁc recodes would make warning
more speciﬁc.’ (Informatics consultant)
Discussion
Principal ﬁndings
There was dissonance between the literature, which
reported that prescribing errors were common, and
the delegates’ irritation with current systems. Some
reported positive eﬀects from the use of prescribing
support applications, butmany reported end users are
highly critical of the prescribing alerts used. The
conclusion of the workshop was that the current
system of prescribing alerts is experienced as prob-
lematic by some end users, it is often unhelpful and it
disrupts some clinical consultations (Figure 2). How-
ever, attendees appeared unaware of the evidence base
and the range of approaches used in other health
systems for reducing low-yield prompts.
Implications for practice
Despite the shared will for decision support software
to progress in order to improve prescribing safety, the
implications of these ﬁndings are diﬀerent for clin-
icians, software developers, academics and accrediting
organisations.
General practitioners working in the front lines of
medical practice feel they should have more involve-
ment in software development. There needs to be a
wider use of technologies which can better describe
wherediﬃculties lie andcanenabledevelopers, academics
and accrediting bodies to gain a clearer understanding
What is known on this topic What this paper adds
1 Prescribing errors are a major source of
unnecessary morbidity and mortality
1 Clinicians still report being frustrated by numerous
unnecessary alerts and these are frequently
cancelled before being read
2 Prescribing alerts have the potential to improve the
quality and safety of clinical practice
2 Prescribing alerts may displace other important
information clinicians are processing during a
consultation
3 The literature has persistently reported that many
alerts are frequently cancelled and ignored
3 The benefit–harm ratio of alerts needs further
investigation
4 Methods of identifying prompts which are of low
value have been identified, but not widely
implemented
4 Quantitative clinical risk assessment could provide a
better method of balancing possible degree of harm
and its likelihood. This could help select which alerts
are most likely to improve quality and safety
(greatest benefit) and should be displayed
Figure 2 What this study adds
A Vaziri, E Connor, I Shepherd et al180
in order to take corrective measures. Counts of alert
override rates may be a pragmatic ﬁrst step in provid-
ing feedback. In vivo observation of real consultations
is needed, perhaps starting with simple counts of the
number of times that the alerts are overridden, poss-
ibly followed by use of techniques such as the multi-
channel video to provide a greater understanding of
where these alerts improve safety.20
Software designers should continue to work closely
with users and modify software to suit the practical
requirements of healthcare professionals during the
clinical consultation. The ‘costs’ of the prescribing
alerts, including the eﬀect on the clinician’s cognitive
performance, should be taken into account during the
design process.
There is scope to improve communication between
software developers and end users. However, this
relationship also needs to include knowledge devel-
opers and address any liability concerns.21,22
Comparisons with literature
The low speciﬁcity and low utility of the prescribing
alert systems being used in primary care practice is a
widely reported and long-standing problem. Payne
et al reported that 11% of medical prescription
resulted in alerts for drug–drug, drug–allergy or other
hazards and that clinicians prescribed the medicine
and ignored the advice for 88% of even ‘critical’ drug–
drug interaction warnings; though work by Paterno
et al, suggests tiering of alerts is needed to improve
compliance.23,24 Subsequent reports have shown little
diﬀerence: clinicians felt that eight out of nine of all
prescribing alerts are unhelpful,25 and a review of 17
reports on prescribing alerts in 2006 found that between
49% to 96% of all prescribing alerts are overridden by
clinicians.26 The same review found multiple reasons
for this, including low speciﬁcity, low sensitivity, unclear
information content, unnecessary workﬂow disrup-
tions and unsafe and ineﬃcient handling. A recent
study has shown that important and serious alerts are
being ignored in the wake of unhelpful ones.24 ‘Miller’s
magical number’ is a psychological concept that was
ﬁrst described in the 1950s; the number 7 (+/–2) is
hypothesised to be the number of concepts or items
that an individual can retain in their short term
memory.27 Miller demonstrated that most people can
only retain this number of items and that if you add an
additional item something else has tobedropped.There
is a risk that an important item of information might
be displaced by an unnecessary alert.
Alternative approaches to improving the speciﬁcity
of prescribing alert systems have included the use of
clinician’s opinions to analyse the alerts produced in
their system. Data on how speciﬁc interactions and
other medical issues actually harmed patients were
synthesised and clinical opinion was used to develop a
set of alerts identiﬁed as low yield. The alerts were then
removed from the system. This process improved the
number of ‘accepted’ alerts to over 67%.28 Other
approaches to improving alert compliance also in-
clude the tiered presentation of alerts according to
drug–drug interaction severity. In one recent study
tiered presentation received a compliance rate of 29%,
compared with non-tiered presentation at 10%.25
Other safety critical industries have powerful in-
spectorates who carefully analyse fatal and non-fatal
errors. Perhaps the closest medical model is the
conﬁdential enquiry into maternal and child health.29
Inspectorates in the air transport30 and railway trans-
port industries31 raised safety standards on the basis of
actual errors. In all these industries detailed retrospec-
tive analysis is conducted after a critical incident and
corrective and preventative measures are introduced.
The National Patient Safety Agency has only recently
applied this model to prescribing errors made in
primary care with methotrexate. Following analysis,
a mandatory requirement was made of primary care
computer systems to include a speciﬁc alert when
methotrexate is prescribed.32
Adherence or concordance with prescribed therapy
is a major issue in health care. Only a minority of
patients take their medicine as prescribed. Whilst
patients should be fully informed, they may have their
conﬁdence unnecessarily undermined by low speci-
ﬁcity alerts which may not apply in their individual
context. Unnecessary alerts can also distract the doc-
tor and result in the patient feeling unattended to. This
perception has been reported to have a negative
impact on patient compliance with medication.
Limitations of the method
This research may be subject to bias, even though its
ﬁndings are unexpected. Participants were conference
delegates and inevitably self selected; they also
represented only a tiny fraction of practising GPs.
The workshop subject selection, the presentations and
facilitation were all done by the co-authors, who share
a strong interest in informatics. We originally set out
to elicit where CDSS might be used most eﬀectively in
primary care, andmight have prepared diﬀerently had
we set out to investigate the negative eﬀects of pre-
scribing alerts.
Calls for further research
Further research is needed to see if the problems
reported with drug alerts are experiencedmore widely
among GPs, both in the UK and internationally.
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This research should include assessing the potential
harm of prescribing alert systems, including:
1 measuring the inﬂuence of additional prescribing
alerts on clinician’s behaviour and decision making;
2 recording how prescribing alerts inﬂuence patients
both at the time of the consultation and later on in
terms of treatment compliance.
Research is also needed to enable better evaluation
of the eﬀectiveness of the alerts that are presented, and
to better designate which alerts are important and
which are not, as well as to develop a greater under-
standing of why known approaches are not being
adopted.33
Conclusion
Prescribing errors are a major source of unnecessary
morbidity and mortality and prescribing alerts have
the potential to improve the quality and safety of
clinical practice. However, the literature has persist-
ently reported that many alerts are frequently can-
celled and ignored. Clinicians are frustrated by what
they feel are unnecessary alerts thatmay displace other
important information they may be processing at the
time. They also ﬁnd the alerts disruptive to the con-
sultation and often cancel them before reading them.
We conclude that the beneﬁt–harm ratio of alerts
needs further investigation. We believe quantitative
clinical risk assessment couldprovide an accuratemethod
of deciding which alerts are most likely to improve
quality and safety, i.e. would have the greatest beneﬁt.
This would allow the selective presentation of alerts
that would help and not hinder the clinician’s per-
formance.
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